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Abstract 
Background and objectives: Quality of reasoning within non-clinical paranoia and mental simulation 
of future paranoia themed events was investigated by use of a simulation task to determine whether 
paranoid individuals would be restricted or more adept at reasoning about paranoia relevant 
material in comparison to a social anxiety group and a group with low paranoia and social anxiety. 
Method: Participants (N = 63) were divided into the three groups based on paranoia and social 
anxiety scores. They were presented with the beginning and end of an imaginary situation and were 
asked to describe, step-by-step, what they imagined would happen between those two points. They 
were also administered a beads task to evaluate the jumping to conclusion decision making bias. 
Results: The prediction of more adept reasoning was not supported for paranoia. However, the 
social anxiety comparison group on average better simulated a scenario with congruent (socially 
anxious) thematic content compared to ones with non-congruent content.  Further, in an 
exploratory analysis, jumping to conclusions bias was found to be positively related to goodness of 
simulation for paranoia themed scenarios within the paranoia group. Limitations: Study groups were 
relatively small and so power was an issue. Conclusion: The results are discussed in the context of 
the sometimes paradoxical findings in the area of cognitive biases and paranoia. 
 
Keywords: Paranoia, social anxiety, reasoning biases, decision making heuristics  
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Clinical paranoia typically refers to the persecutory delusions found in psychosis.  However, 
paranoia in its broader sense is common within non-clinical populations (e.g., Bebbington et al., 
2013; Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, 2003; Freeman, Garety, McGuire, & Kuipers, 2005), and research 
into processes along the paranoia continuum has made use of non-clinical samples to help inform 
the understanding of clinical paranoia (e.g., Freeman, McManus, Brugha, Melzer, Jenkins, & 
Bebbington, 2011; Johns, Cannon, Singleton, Murray, Farrell, Brugha, et al., 2004).  Anxiety is 
proposed to play a key role in paranoia across the continuum, and so knowledge of the mechanisms 
that give rise to anxiety, particularly social anxiety, is potentially central to the understanding of 
paranoia.  It is notable that both paranoia and social anxiety involve the expectation of negative 
responses from others (Tone, Goulding, & Compton, 2011) and that similar reasoning patterns, such 
as the failure to consider or generate alternative explanations for aversive social experiences, are 
viewed as key features of both persecutory ideation and social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Freeman et al., 2004; Schutters et al., 2012).     
The presence of reasoning biases such as jumping to conclusions (JTC; Garety, Hemsley, & 
Wessely, 1991; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988) is well established in paranoia. These biases are 
hypothesized to lead to rapid acceptance of beliefs despite limited supporting evidence and to 
preclude consideration of alternative explanations for troubling experiences, thus maintaining 
paranoid beliefs (Freeman, 2007). However, findings to date have mainly been based on laboratory 
tasks, and a clear delineation of how these phenomena contribute to real world reasoning is still 
being established.  One approach to addressing this gap has examined the potential role of decision 
making heuristics. For example, Corcoran, et al. (2006) compared people with persecutory delusion 
to controls on a series of heuristic decision making tasks. They found a correlation between 
estimates of future threat and the rate of recollection of similar past events. The authors took this to 
reflect the operation of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1982), according to 
which probability estimates of a future event increase when past instances of similar events can be 
brought to mind.  Kahneman and Tversky (1982) described a corresponding reasoning tendency for 
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anticipated rather than recalled events. According to the simulation heuristic, the subjective 
probability of a given outcome depends upon the fluency of the mentally constructed model of the 
hypothetical situation. The concerns of individuals with delusions are frequently about imagined 
events that have never occurred before and, indeed, are likely to be viewed by others as being 
implausible. Therefore, the simulation heuristic is arguably a better fit to paranoia than the 
availability heuristic. In this connection, Corcoran (2010) argued that difficulty in mentally projecting 
oneself into a hypothetical future is the common thread underlying social cognition irregularities in 
psychosis.  
  An established methodology that has been used to capture the simulation heuristic 
involves providing the start and end of a scenario and requiring participants to mentally simulate the 
missing middle part of the scenario (Brown, MacLeod, Tata, & Goddard, 2002). Brown et al. (2002) 
asked participants (pregnant women) to imagine going into labour and reaching the hospital in time. 
“Goodness of simulation” (GOS) of the narrative connecting the beginning with the ending was 
shown to be associated with increased subjective probability of a positive outcome and a reduction 
in worry.  In a subsequent study of individuals with OCD symptoms, simulations of scenarios related 
to personally relevant obsessive fears were judged to be more coherent and were regarded by 
participants as more likely to occur than non-personal OCD scenarios (Keen, Brown, & Wheatley, 
2008). The general premise  that individuals with emotional problems are more adept at reasoning 
about themes consistent in content with their difficulties is the basis of  the Hyper Emotion Theory 
of psychological illnesses (HET; Johnson-Laird, Mancini, & Gangemi, 2006), which offers an account 
of how this tendency develops. The theory proposes that efforts to make sense of intense emotional 
experiences serve to elaborate and perpetuate these experiences, resulting in enhanced reasoning 
abilities on topics relevant to the problem. Explicit tests of the theory have been supportive (e.g., 
Gangemi, Mancini, & Johnson-Laird, 2013). Gangemi et al. found that individuals with depression 
and anxiety reasoned more validly and with fewer logical biases than controls, particularly with 
regard to affect congruent stimuli.  
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In an extension of the simulation approach to paranoia, Huddy, Brown, Boyd, and Wykes 
(2014) found that  individuals with clinical paranoia produced less coherent simulations overall than 
matched controls (a finding recently replicated by Huddy, Drake, and Wykes, 2016) and did not, as 
predicted, produce more coherent simulations for scenarios that featured the negative intentions of 
others. Instead, those with paranoia were less able than controls to produce more coherent 
responses for scenarios that featured the positive intentions of others.  However, as Huddy et al. 
(2014) noted, scenarios were not matched to individuals’ specific concerns, as was the case in the 
Keen et al. (2008) study on OCD symptoms, and so the results did not necessarily contradict the 
predictions of the HET with regard to enhanced reasoning about paranoia themes.  Further, the 
results may have been confounded with general cognitive deficits or the effects of medication. 
Finally, the absence of a symptomatic control group limited the conclusions that could be drawn 
about the specificity of observed reasoning patterns to paranoia.  
 To address these methodological issues, the current study employed the simulation task in a 
non-clinical analogue paranoia sample.  The main question was whether paranoid individuals would 
be restricted in reasoning or whether they would be more adept reasoners in line with the HET 
(Johnson-Laird et al., 2006), as reflected in better simulations when the situation related to personal 
fears and concerns.  Participants with high levels of paranoia were compared to socially anxious 
participants without high paranoia and a control group low on both paranoia and social anxiety with 
regard to their mental simulations of paranoia and social anxiety themed scenarios to determine if 
the symptomatic groups (paranoia and social anxiety) were more adept reasoners about content 
related to their symptoms compared to neutral content. It was also predicted, in line with the 
assumptions of the simulation heuristic, that the ease with which a scenario could be simulated (i.e., 
“goodness of simulation”) would relate to increased subjective probability for that situation 
occurring, which would, in turn, be associated with greater worry about the simulated outcome.  A 
final consideration was whether the pattern of reasoning about personally relevant topics might be 
associated with, or moderated by, the presence of reasoning biases such as the JTC bias. JTC bias 
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was among the irregularities that Corcoran (2010) argued stemmed from an underlying difficulty in 
mentally projecting oneself across time in order to reason hypothetically; it should therefore be 
associated with worse simulations, contradicting the predictions of HET. It was hoped that this 
apparent contradiction could be investigated empirically through exploratory analyses of the 
relationship between JTC and goodness of simulation.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 63 undergraduate psychology students from a British university who 
participated for course credit. Fifty-four (85.7%) participants were female, nine (14.3%) were male; 
the mean age of the overall sample was 19.9 years (SD = 5.1; range = 17 – 48 years).  They were 
divided into groups of high paranoia, high social anxiety, and low paranoia/social anxiety based on 
their scores on the Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; see below), a measure of sub-
clinical paranoia, and the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000; see below), a measure 
of social anxiety. Eighteen participants showed elevated scores on the PS ( ≥ 53; +1 SD) and formed 
the high paranoia group; normative data from the student sample reported by Fenigstein and 
Vanable (1992) were used to identify the cut off score for determining paranoia group membership, 
consistent with previous studies  (e.g., Combs, Michael, & Penn, 2006; Combs & Penn, 2004; Combs 
et al., 2007).  Additionally, individuals scoring at or above this cut-off on the PS have been reported 
to show similar social, cognitive, and behavioural biases to those found in individuals with 
persecutory delusions (e.g., Combs & Penn, 2004; Combs et al., 2007). Note that this group was not 
required to be low in social anxiety, as research in representative populations suggests social anxiety 
is intrinsic to paranoia (e.g., Bebbington et al, 2013).  
 Connor et al. (2000) reported that a score of 19 on the SPIN distinguished between 
participants with and without social phobia.  Participants in the current study who scored >19 on the 
SPIN but <53 on the PS formed the social anxiety (SA) group (n = 22).  Participants below both cut-
offs formed the “low” paranoia/social anxiety comparison group (n = 23). There were no differences 
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between groups for age (H (2) = 4.36, p = 0.11), gender (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.73), ethnicity (2 (2) 
= 1.17, p = 0.56), English as a first language (N = 41 of 63 overall, 2 (2) = 3.24, p = 0.20), or 
experience of a mental health problem (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.27). 
Materials & Measures 
The simulation task. The simulation task was based on the procedure employed by Brown et 
al. (2002), which was modelled on the Means-Ends Problem Solving approach (Platt & Spivack, 
1977). Participants were presented with the beginning and end of an imaginary situation and were 
asked to describe, step-by-step, what they imagined would happen between those two points (see 
Appendix 1 for all scenarios). Standardized task instructions and prompts were used for the task, and 
participant responses to scenarios were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
 Two paranoia themed scenarios (“Friend” and “Job”) were developed from student 
narratives from a non-clinical study of paranoid experiences (Allen-Crooks & Ellett, 2014). Narratives 
were examined to identify frequently occurring themes and experiences; these narratives were then 
used to inform the construction of the start and end points of paranoia-evoking scenarios used in 
the current study.  A further paranoia scenario (“Public Place”) was taken from Huddy et al. (2014), 
developed from a qualitative clinical study of individuals experiencing persecutory paranoia (Boyd & 
Gumley, 2007). The scenario was found by Huddy et al. (2014) to be the most successful in evoking 
hostile content in responses.  Hostility was used as an indicator of paranoia in responses as it was 
presumed to capture the two main features of paranoia as defined by Freeman and Garety (2000)--
the presence of a persecutor and the threat or intention of harm. Presence of hostility in responses 
was rated post-hoc by two independent raters (see below). 
Instructions for the “Friend” scenario differed to the other scenarios in that participant 
responses were directed toward two possible outcomes of the scenario; the scenario was presented 
twice with differing ending instructions, once requesting a response in which a friend had betrayed 
their trust and once where respondents were asked to give a response in which a friend had 
remained loyal. Order of the loyal and disloyal endings was counterbalanced. A social anxiety 
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scenario (“Speech”) was constructed that described a social evaluation situation that ended with 
scrutiny by others. The scenario of unexpectedly having to stand up and speak is extensively used as 
a social anxiety manipulation and so was thought to be face valid as a relevant stimulus for social 
anxiety. Finally, a neutral non-paranoia evoking scenario (“Shop”) was taken from Huddy (2008) that 
included content intended to omit any threat or intention of harm. It was found by Huddy et al. 
(2014) to produce responses with minimal hostility content.  Following presentation of each 
scenario, consistent with previous studies using the simulation task methodology (i.e., Huddy et al., 
2014, Keen et al., 2008), participants made ratings of ease of imagining, subjective probability of the 
situation, distress relating to thinking about the situation, and distress relating to the outcome of the 
situation on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). A subjective potency (SP) variable 
(range 2-14) was then constructed by combining scores from the two post-scenario questions 
relating to ease of imagining and subjective probability , following the approach taken by Huddy et 
al. (2014). A worry variable was constructed from the two post-scenario questions relating to 
distress (range 2-14). 
Scenario coding. The coding system for determining goodness of simulation (GOS) was based 
on Brown et al. (2002). Simulation responses to each scenario were rated according to six criteria: 
logical sequencing, temporal ordering, minimization of uncertainty, level of detail, ease of imagining, 
and smooth flow. Responses were also rated for hostility as defined by the judged presence of 
negative intent directed towards the respondent. All GOS criteria and hostility were rated on a 3-
point scale (range 1-3) of the extent to which the aspect was present.  Total score for GOS ranged 
from 6-18, with higher scores indicating better simulation. Following training and practice with 
example responses, two independent raters assigned scores for each GOS criterion and for presence 
of hostility for all scenarios from all participants. Scenario responses were presented to raters in a 
random order. 
Event Ranking Questionnaire (ERQ; Keen et al., 2008). Participants were presented with nine 
brief statements, including statements describing the three paranoia and one social anxiety 
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scenarios; remaining statements were distracter items. Participants were asked to rank the 
statements in order of  most to least upsetting from 1-9, to rate their degree of upset on a 4-point 
scale from “not at all” to “extremely” upsetting, and  to rank statements in order of  similarity to 
typical personal worries.  This resulted in an overall score from which the most personally relevant 
scenario could be identified. A brief distracter questionnaire of five questions about the European 
Union was administered after the ERQ in order to discourage priming on the simulation task. 
Probabilistic Reasoning Task (“Beads Task”; Huq et al., 1988).  This task assessed data 
gathering reasoning style and JTC. Participants were shown a card containing a picture of two jars 
that each contained 100 red and blue coloured beads in proportions of 60 red and 40 blue beads in 
Jar 1, and 60 blue and 40 red in Jar 2 (60:40 ratio; Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997). Participants 
were told that one jar had been randomly selected and were shown pictures of beads drawn from 
the selected jar and asked to decide which jar had been selected based on the beads drawn. The 
primary measure was number of bead draws requested prior to making a decision. 
The Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). The PS contains 20 items with 
responses given on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all applicable to me) to 5 (extremely 
applicable to me). Higher scores indicate greater levels of paranoia. Good levels of internal 
consistency (α = .84) and test-retest reliability (r = .70) have been reported within non-clinical 
student samples (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and has been validated as a measure of paranoid 
ideation within clinically diagnosed groups (Smári, Stefánsson, & Thorgilsson, 1994).  
The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000). The SPIN comprises 17 items rated 
on a 5-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely), based on presence of symptoms over the past 
week. Total scores range from 0 to 68 with higher scores indicating greater distress. The SPIN has 
been reported as a reliable and valid measure of social anxiety within non-clinical student 
populations. Radomsky et al. (2006) reported the SPIN total score to exhibit excellent internal 
consistency (α = .93), excellent test-retest reliability (r = .86) and good convergent validity within a 
sample of 202 undergraduate students.  
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Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). The HADS is a 14-
item self-report questionnaire consisting of seven anxiety and seven depression related questions 
rated on a 4-point scale from 0 to 3, and based on symptoms observed in the past week. The HADS is 
a widely used measure and good levels of internal consistency on both the depression and anxiety 
scales (α = .76 and .80 respectively) have been reported (Mykletun, Stordal, & Dahl, 2001). It was 
included in the present study to help characterize the participants making up the analogue sample of 
the present study.  
Procedure 
Participants were administered the procedure singly by an experimenter in a quiet room.  
Measures and study tasks were presented in the following order: The ERQ and ERQ distracter task, 
the Probabilistic Reasoning Task, and then the simulation task followed by post-scenario ratings. The 
procedure for the simulation task followed the method of Brown et al. (2002) and Huddy et al. 
(2014). The neutral (Shop) scenario was presented first and the “Friend” scenario where participants 
were directly asked to simulate a response where someone had betrayed their trust last. The 
remaining scenarios were presented in random order. The PS, SPIN and HADs were completed 
following the simulation task. The simulation task took 40 minutes to complete on average, and the 
entire procedure took about 70 minutes.  
Results 
Sample characteristics 
Scores on symptoms measures and JTC are presented in Table 1. Differences on the PS and 
SPIN reflect the group assignment procedure. There were no differences on beads task, (F(2, 60) 
=0.75, p = 0.48). The paranoia and SA group did not differ on anxiety (HAD-A) and depression (HAD-
D) but both were significantly more anxious and depressed than the control group (t(24.83) = 4.79, p 
< 0.001), and t(43) = 4.55, p < 0.001, respectively for HAD-A and  t(39) = 3.26, p = 0.002), and t(34.82) 
= 3.11, p = 0.004, respectively, for HAD-D).  Furthermore, as a check on whether the highly female 
gender make-up of the sample was likely to distort the results, both point-biserial correlations of 
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gender with the full set of variables used in subsequent analyses and Mann-Whitney U group 
comparisons were carried out. The only significant difference was for females to have lower Loyal 
Friend scenario GOS scores (U = 129, p = .025). This variable did not ultimately figure prominently in 
the subsequent analyses, and so there is no compelling evidence for the possibility that gender 
significantly distorted the results reported in the rest of this section.  
Table 1 
Mood, social anxiety, paranoia and data gathering scores by group 
           Paranoia  
            (n=18) 
    Social Anxiety  
           (n = 22) 
  Low on both  
      (n = 23) 
Measure M SD M SD M SD 
       SPIN 22.89 12.75 27.59 8.28 9.65 5.73 
PS 60.44 7.77 38.09 6.28 30.74 6.69 
Beads Task 8.50 3.62 9.64 4.40 10.17 4.89 
HAD-A  10.50 4.42 9.14 3.64 4.96 2.42 
HAD-D  4.06 2.75 3.73 2.39 1.87 1.49 
Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory. PS = Paranoia Scale; HAD-A and HAD-D, Hospital Anxiety Scale 
Anxiety and Depression Scales.  
 
Inter-rater agreement 
A total of 378 scenario responses were rated (63 participants and 6 scenario types). Overall 
agreement on ratings within one point rating was 97.3% across all scenarios. The intra-class 
correlation (ICC) coefficient between raters ranged from 0.70 to 0.84 across GOS criteria and 
hostility.  The overall Cronbach’s α calculated on the six GOS dimensions from both raters was 0.86; 
rating dimension scores were therefore combined to calculate a total GOS score (range 6-18), taking 
the average GOS of the two raters. 
Tests of the main hypotheses 
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Facility vs. restriction in reasoning. Mean GOS scores for each scenario by group are shown 
in Table 2. A series of analyses was carried out testing various hypotheses regarding facilitation of 
reasoning following from the HET using different ways of aggregating the GOS scores.  The GOS 
score for the affect-neutral shop scenario, which was included as a point of reference for general 
GOS performance, did not differ by group (F(2, 60) = 0.41, p = 0.67). In the first analysis, the 
loyal/disloyal friend scenario GOS scores were compared. The predicted Group x Scenario 
interaction (with the paranoia group having relatively higher GOS scores for the disloyal scenario 
according to the facilitation prediction of the HET) was not found; in fact, the observed mean 
differences were in the opposite direction, with the paranoia group having the highest positive 
disparity between loyal and disloyal scenarios. The loyal friend scenario was not analyzed further 
following this contradictory result.  
Next, the paranoia scenario was identified for each participant that had the highest rank on 
the ERQ, and its GOS score was compared to the average GOS of the remaining (nonpersonal) 
paranoia scenarios for each person. A mixed (Group x Personal Scenario Type) ANOVA did not find 
the predicted interaction, F(2, 60) = .092, p = .91. Thus, the main hypothesis with regard to 
facilitation in reasoning for matched paranoia content was not supported. The third HET hypothesis 
was that facilitation would be evident between groups, with the symptomatic groups being highest 
on GOS for content congruent with their main problem. An average paranoia GOS score was 
computed for the three paranoia scenarios, which was compared to the social anxiety scenario. 
There was a significant Group x Scenario interaction [F(4,120) = 2.67, p = .038, sphericity assumed]. 
Follow up planned contrasts  confirmed, as is indicated in Table 2,  that the source of the interaction 
was the elevation on the social anxiety scenario for the high social anxiety group compared to the 
paranoia group (p = .01) and the control group (p = .018), which did not differ from each other.  
Likewise, within the social anxiety group, the social anxiety scenario GOS was significantly elevated 
relative to the average GOS of the paranoia scenarios (p = .022).   
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Table 2 
GOS scores (M, SD) by Scenario Type and Group 
 Paranoia (n=18) SA (n = 22) Low  (n = 23) 
Scenario M SD M SD M SD 
Shop 16.25 1.60 16.24 1.71 15.85 1.68 
Social anxiety  13.87 2.34 15.67 1.73 14.12 2.32 
Public place 14.56 1.73 14.56 1.86 14.22 1.86 
Job 13.94 2.15 14.36 1.89 14.89 1.74 
Loyal Friend 14.69 2.30 14.96 2.30 15.17 2.26 
Disloyal Friend 14.08 2.70 14.76 1.53 14.96 1.57 
Personal paranoia  14.22 2.43 14.43 1.88 14.74 1.57 
Non-personal 
paranoia  
14.18 1.93 14.62 1.31 14.67 1.13 
 Note. SA = Social Anxiety 
 Relationship between GOS, Subjective Potency (SP) and Worry. Spearman’s correlations (as 
within group correlations were planned and groups were relatively small) were calculated to 
examine whether GOS would be associated with increased SP, and that SP would, in turn, be 
associated with  worry (see Table 3). On the highest ranking ERQ scenario in the overall sample there 
were significant positive correlations found between GOS and SP (r(61) = 0.22, p = 0.04), and 
between SP and worry (r(61) = 0.31, p = 0.006). There were no significant associations between GOS 
and SP for the average of the remaining lower-ranked scenarios and a significant negative 
correlation between GOS and worry for the combined sample (r(61) = -0.26, p = 0.02).  On the social 
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anxiety scenario, there were no significant correlations between any of the post-scenario ratings and 
GOS. There was, however, a trend towards significance between subjective potency and GOS for the 
SA group (r(20) = 0.35, p = 0.055).  
Table 3 
 
Spearman Correlations of GOS, Worry and Subjective Potency, by Group and Scenario Type 
 Group 
 
Scenario 
Paranoia Social Anxiety Low 
Paranoia/Anxiety 
Overall 
Personal 
Paranoia 
  GOS-SP 
  SP-Worry 
  GOS-Worry 
 
 
 .33^ 
.12 
-.09 
 
 
-.17 
 .44* 
.02 
 
 
   .61** 
 .32^ 
.07 
 
 
  .22* 
    .31** 
.07 
Non-personal   
  GOS-SP 
  SP-Worry 
  GOS-Worry 
 
.08 
-.38^ 
-.06 
 
-.05 
-.02 
-.02 
 
.01 
-.21 
-.56 
 
.08 
-.23 
-.26 
Social Anxiety 
  GOS-SP 
  SP-Worry 
  GOS-Worry 
 
-.05 
.29 
-.13 
 
  .35^ 
.25 
.08 
 
.07 
-.21 
-.03 
 
.12 
.12 
-.01 
 
Note. Paranoia group n = 18, df = 16, SA group n = 22, df = 20, low group n = 23, df =21, combined n 
= 63, df = 61; WR, scenario worry rating; SP, scenario subjective potency rating;  ^ p < 0.1 ,  * p < 
0.05,  ** p < 0.01. 
Exploratory analysis of GOS and JTC.   
It was not possible to make an a priori prediction regarding the expected relationship 
between GOS and JTC.   JTC as a reflection of disjointed reasoning would be expected to be 
associated with low GOS, but, according to the HET, the well-established association of JTC and 
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paranoia would predict greater facility, and a higher GOS score, for paranoia evoking content. The 
average paranoia GOS score was regressed on beads draws to decision and group membership (SA 
and control groups  were combined for the present analysis given no differential prediction between 
these groups). Group was entered in the first step, followed by bead draws and the interaction term. 
There was no effect for group [F(1,61)=1.50, p = .23) or beads draws [F(1,60) = .41, p = .53]. 
However, the ∆R2 for the interaction term was .05, and this was significant [F(1,59) = 4.27, p = .043].  
As shown in Figure 1, there was no association between number of bead draws in the non-paranoia 
group and a negative relationship in the paranoia group—fewer draws to decision (i.e., greater JTC 
bias) was associated with higher GOS.  
Figure 1 
Relationship between bead draws and goodness of simulation by group (Paranoia versus Non-
paranoia) for average paranoia scenario 
 
 
Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate reasoning within non-clinical paranoia by use 
of a simulation task (Brown et al., 2002), following on from a similar study of clinical paranoia (Huddy 
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et al., 2014), while addressing some of the methodological issues raised in the earlier study.  The 
central prediction, in line with Hyper Emotion Theory (HET; Johnson-Laird et al., 2006) was that 
paranoid and socially anxious individuals would be adept reasoners about content matching their 
areas of concern and that this would be reflected in good mental simulations of relevant scenarios. 
As was the case in the Huddy et al. (2014) study, the prediction was not supported for paranoia. 
However, the social anxiety comparison group on average better simulated a scenario with 
congruent thematic content compared to one with non-congruent content.  Partial support was also 
found for the prediction, based on the putative operation of the simulation heuristic, that better 
simulations would be associated with greater worry, which would in turn be associated with higher 
subjective probabilities. Finally, in an exploratory analysis, jumping to conclusions bias was found to 
be positively related to goodness of simulation for paranoia themed scenarios within the paranoia 
group.  
The finding that the social anxiety group provided better simulations on average for a 
scenario with congruent content parallels Keen et al.’s (2008) findings in a group with OCD 
symptoms.  Johnson-Laird et al. (2006) suggest a number of reasoning processes that likely 
contribute to the development of enhanced reasoning for content congruent with a disorder, 
including confirmatory and emotional reasoning (Arntz, Rauner, & van den Hout, 1995) and 
repetitive elaboration of anticipated outcomes, which has been shown to raise subjective 
probabilities for those outcomes (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). A number of consistent effects have 
been reported in the social anxiety literature. Thus, Wild (2009) found that rehearsal of negative 
imagery within social anxiety increased its familiarity and was associated with increased belief in a 
negative self-image, and Morrison, Amir and Taylor (2011) similarly suggested that imagery may be 
generated more efficiently as a result of over-practice.   
It is not immediately apparent that paranoia would be any worse a fit to HET than OCD, 
social anxiety, or any of the several other emotional problems included in the Johnson-Laird et al. 
(2006) paper in which the theory is set out.  Elaboration of potential outcomes (Tversky & Koehler, 
 17 
1994) and confirmatory and emotional reasoning appear to be equally implicated in the 
phenomenology of paranoia.  However, HET crucially proposes that individuals are only adept 
reasoners within their area of preoccupation. Huddy et al. (2014) suggested with regard to their 
clinical sample that the scenarios they used, although constructed around themes systematically 
identified by Boyd and Gumley (2007) within a clinical paranoia sample, may not have been relevant 
enough to individuals’ idiosyncratic concerns.  The present study likewise used scenarios based on 
narratives of paranoia experiences from a student population comparable to the sample of the 
present study (Allen-Crooks & Ellett, 2014), along with the best performing scenario from Huddy et 
al. (2014), but these still might not have corresponded, for a sufficient portion of the sample, to their 
own paranoia evoking ideation. Keen et al. (2008), for example, reported that when scenarios were 
not relevant to an individual’s OCD related concerns, even if still OCD themed, GOS was reduced and 
inversely related to worry.  It may very well be that the method employed in the current study is 
only suited to phenomena like OCD and social anxiety that are more faithfully captured by 
prototypical scenarios that are more likely to resonate with a given member of the symptom group. 
This may not be achievable for paranoia, where the concerns are more particularized to an 
individual’s circumstances.  
An alternative possibility is that the lack of evidence of enhanced facility with prototypical 
paranoia content in the format in which it is presented in the present study may be a substantive 
difference between paranoia and anxiety disorders, and, particularly, may form part of the basis on 
which paranoia may be discriminated from social anxiety, to which it is tied conceptually in theories 
of paranoia (e.g., Freeman et al., 2004). The simulation paradigm presumes that reasoning about 
hypothetical scenarios makes use of imagery (e.g., Raune, MacLeod, & Holmes, 2005), and the 
anticipatory nature of anxiety problems like social anxiety, OCD, and worry, for which evidence has 
been found for a role for simulation, may promote rehearsal of disorder relevant imagery content. In 
contrast, it may be that paranoia is most marked as people reason following present time 
perceptions (e.g., a glance or a snatch of conversation) that is less anticipatory, less evocative of 
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imagery, and so less addressable by the current task where verbal statements are intended to elicit 
image-based reasoning process. Paranoia, instead (still potentially consistent with the HET), may be 
more characterized, on balance, by the type of post-event ruminative processing also found in social 
anxiety. Further research that can dissociate anticipatory, real-time, and poct hoc processes could 
shed light on this question. 
In an exploratory finding, JTC appeared to moderate the relationship between paranoia and 
GOS, with lower GOS found in the paranoia group for those with greater draws to decision (i.e., with 
a relative lack of JTC bias).  Were this finding to replicate, further research would be necessary to 
clarify the basis for the relationship. A plausible account consistent with existing findings in this area 
would start with liberal acceptance of potentially unusual logical inferences made by those with JTC 
bias  (Corcoran, 2010; Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006) that is not subjected to 
disconfirmatory evaluation (e.g., Freeman, 2007; Woodward et al., 2006). The relevant lines of 
reasoning would subsequently be reinforced through the mechanisms proposed by HET, giving rise 
to greater ease of simulation for the content with repeated engagement. This highlights the fact that 
the HET is in essence a developmental theory that can only be conclusively supported through 
longitudinal research.   
Confirmatory evidence that JTC bias was functionally related to higher GOS would not be 
atypical of the paradoxical and contradictory nature of the current findings in the area of cognitive 
biases and paranoia.  The introduction to a recent special journal issue devoted to the area was 
entitled “Cognition and delusions: What do we know, what do we guess, what do we perhaps falsely 
believe?” (Balzan & Moritz, 2017).  Indeed, there appears to be an emerging understanding that 
phenomena regarded as potentially maladaptive biases may be situationally adaptive. A recent 
meta-analysis of JTC and delusional thinking (Dudley, Taylor, Wickham, & Hutton, 2015) found that, 
although those with psychosis had higher odds of extreme JTC responding compared to controls, a 
substantial minority of the comparison participants (29% of non-clinical controls and 38% of clinical 
controls) met the conventional criterion of 1-2 draws considered to reflect extreme JTC. Similarly, 
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van Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis, and McKay (2015) employed an incentivized version of the standard JTC 
task to establish, for the first time, an optimum number of draws relative to which it could be judged 
whether respondents were jumping to a conclusion.  They found that non-clinical participants who 
were relatively more delusion-prone showed the usual fewer draws on average than the non-
delusion prone comparison group; however, both they and the comparison groups, on average, 
“jumped” before the optimum decision point.  
That putatively extreme or at least suboptimal responding on bias tasks is relatively 
commonplace suggests that these biases are likely to be adaptively motivated and may be relied 
upon because they do not inevitably produce adverse consequences. Gangemi and Cardella (2014) 
reviewed a range of investigations into reasoning in psychosis in which initial adverse effects are no 
longer found when moderators such as intelligence are accounted for, and other situations in which 
a putative bias or reasoning error is ultimately advantageous. They suggest, for example, where real 
danger is perceived to be possible, jumping to conclusions could be viewed as being consistent with 
a “better safe than sorry” conservative safety seeking strategy that over-responds to potential 
dangers so as not to delay reacting to real dangers when they occur. Summarizing the relevant 
research, Gangemi and Cardella conclude that “in some cases, schizophrenics are more logical than 
healthy people, they are able to judge the validity of a syllogism without being distracted by its 
content, they falsify conditional rules without being diverted by heuristic traps and they are usually 
less sensitive to a number of reasoning biases” (p. 109). This is also consistent with the 
conceptualization of paranoia, from an evolutionary perspective, as a trait that was selected due to 
its adaptive value in allowing detection of threat to self by others (Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, , 2003).  
There are clear limitations of the current study that should be clearly acknowledged. First of 
all, despite general support of the continuum approach to paranoia in the literature, paranoia within 
the current sample is a non-clinical analogue of a clinical phenomenon. Moreover, the sample was 
overwhelmingly female. Whereas analyses checking for readily apparent distortion of results due to 
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gender composition provided some assurance in this regard, the results need to be regarded as 
provisional until repeated in a demographically more representative sample.  
In summary, the present study was unsuccessful in its main aim of demonstrating the 
operation of the simulation heuristic within paranoia. However, the heuristic appeared to operate as 
predicted within social anxiety, therefore extending previous findings in relation to worry and 
obsessive compulsive symptoms. Possible reasons for the negative findings with regard to paranoia 
include the need to match content more idiographically to individual concerns or the potential 
mediating and moderating effects of cognitive style factors that may produce contradictory effects 
under different circumstances.   These factors should be investigated further in future research. 
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Appendix 1 – Simulation task scenarios 
 
1. Shop (neutral): At the beginning of the scenario, you are returning items to a shop. The cashier 
tells you that their policy does not allow you to do so without a receipt. 
 At the end of the situation, you leave the shop with your refund.  
 
2. Speech (social anxiety): At the beginning of the situation, you are at a gathering at which, 
unexpectedly, each person attending has been told they will be asked to stand up in front of the 
group to give a short speech about themselves.   
At the end of the situation, the meeting has been interrupted and a crowd of people has gathered 
around you looking concerned.  
 
3. Job: At the beginning of the situation, you have arrived home after a job interview. During the 
course of the evening, you receive several phone calls from unidentified numbers, and each time 
you answer the phone the person on the other end of the line hangs up.  At the end of the situation, 
it is the next day and you receive a call from the potential employer informing you that they have 
been unable to arrive at a decision and will be interviewing other candidates. 
 
4. Public Place: At the beginning of the situation, you are sitting in a public place and an older man 
sits down next to you and starts speaking to you. He is very keen to talk and asks you about yourself.   
At the end of the situation, you are making your way home when you see the man speaking on his 
mobile phone.   
 
5. Friend (loyal and disloyal): At the beginning of the situation you have just introduced a good friend 
to someone you are acquainted with but do not know very well.  The three of you end up discussing 
your weekend plans.   
At the end of the situation, it is the next Monday, and you log onto Facebook and see pictures of 
your friend and the other person together at a party you were not invited to.   
i) (But) on this occasion I want you to provide a response in which your friend has 
betrayed your trust 
ii) (but now) I’d like you to provide a response in which your friend has stayed completely 
loyal 
